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[Sac. No. 7097. In Bank. Mar. 23, 1961.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ORVAL LUCAS et aI., 
Appellants. 
[1] Taxa.tion-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Amount 
Required.-Thc amount of "sold taxes" required by Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 4102, to redcem property sold to the state for de-
linquent taxes is a combination of taxes that were a lien 
on the propel·ty when sold to the state and the taxes asscssed 
for each subsequent year as shown on the delinquent rolls or 
that wonld have been shown had the property been assessed 
,vhere it was not assessed for· any year (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 123). Since the assessments for these years must take into 
. aecount any reduction in value in the years following removal 
of timber from the land (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 123, 401, 405, 
406, 566, 4104), the mere fact that the redemptioners paid 
the back taxes on the property does not mean that they paid 
taxes on removed timber. . 
[2] ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Redemption - Amount Re-
quired.-Taxes are exactions for the support of government, 
110t the purchase price of property, and by paying taxes on 
redemption the redemptionel's are paying the amount due for 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 313; Am.Jur., Taxation, §§ 1100, 
1103,1118. 
licK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Taxation, § 335; [3J Taxation, 
~ 362; [4] Taxation, § 329; [5,8,9] Taxation, § 338; [6] Taxation, 
§ 323; [7] Taxation, § 327; [10-13, 15] Taxation, § 324; [14J Re-
mainders and Reversions, § 11. 
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that support, not buying the land and timber. Even if re-
demption could be regarded as a purchase, it would be a pur-
chase of the land in the condition it was in at the time of 
redemption, and the state would be no less entitled to pro-
ceeds from the property during its ownership than it would 
had the property been sold at public auction. 
[3] ld.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-A tax deed to the state for delin-
quent taxes conveys absolute title to the property. The state 
can occupy such property and exploit its natural resources and 
has the exclusive right to all proceeds from the property, in-
cluding proceeds from such resources (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 3441, 3651), and it can improve the property or allow it 
to deteriorate in value. 
[4] ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption.-Statutory pro-
visions authorizing redemption from tax sales are simply an 
offer by the state to reconvey the property on the terms pre-
scribed if it has not already been sold at public auction. 
[5] ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Rights of Re-
demptioner.-The statutes authorizing redemption from tax 
sales cannot reasonably be construed as implying that on 
redemption the redemptioner is entitled to the property in the 
condition it was in at the time of the tax deed. 
[6] Id.-8ale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Title.-The only 
difference between the title acquired by the state at a tax sale 
and that of a private purchaser is the privilege of redemption; 
that is, the state's title is absolute, but subject to defeasance 
should the former owner exercise his privilege of redemp. 
tion. 
[7] ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Rights-Rents 
and Profits.-While rights incident to ownership of property 
conveyed to the state for delinquent taxes are no more limited 
than those of an individual who has title to real property and 
while they cease on transfer of title, certain rights, such as 
that to rents and profits which accrued during the period of 
ownership, are personal and do not pass with the deed or 
cease to be actionable on conveyance of the property. 
[8] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Effect.-Under 
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 4112, a tax deed is not void from the be-
ginning but only on redemption; the state's interest in the land 
then ceases because title has passed to the redemptioner. 
[9] ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Effect.-A right 
of action which accrued during the time the state was the 
owner of property conveyed to it for delinquent taxes is not 
terminated by redemption; the state is in the sallie position 
as that of an individual who conveys land to which he has 
title. 
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[10] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Tuea--Purchasera--Rights.-The 
phrase "arising in any manner" in Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3651, 
relating to tqe state's right to receive all proceeds from tax-
deeded property. precludes the drawing of nny distinction 
according to the manner in which the proceeds arise, wht'ther 
from rent or from the sale of timber. 
[11] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Tuea--Purcha.sers-Rights.-The 
mnking of any exception to the state's right "to receive all 
proceeds arising in any manner" from tax-deeded prop-
erty (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3651) for proceeds from the sale of 
timber is foreclosed by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3441, which makes 
it a misdemeanor to do any act tending permanently to impair 
the value of tax-deeded property, including the cutting or 
removal of timber, and expressly provides for recovery of 
damages by the state for such cutting or removal. 
[12] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Tues-Purcha.sera--Rights.-The 
making of any exception to the state's right to receive all 
proceeds from tax-deeded property (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3651) 
for a redemptioner is foreclosed by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3441, 
relating to impairment of value of such property, which refers 
to "every person" and therefore to a redemptioner as well as a 
stranger to the title. 
[18] Id.-8ale for Delinquent Tues-Purchasera--Rights.-No 
atatute makes the state's right to recover proceeds arising 
from tax-deeded property depend on whether there bas been 
a redemption. 
[14] Remainders and Reversiona--Actiona.-A person having an 
estate in fee or in remainder or a reversion may maintain an 
action for injury to the inheritance though, after its commis-
sion, his estate is transferred and he has no interest in the 
property at commencement of the action. (Civ. Code, § 826.) 
[15] Tuation-8ale for Delinquent Taxea--Purchasera--Rights.-
Where land has been sold to the state for delinquent taxes, the 
former owner should not be permitted to retain proceeds from 
the sale of timber on the land since to do so would condone 
a trespass to property that Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3441, makes 
a crime, would encourage the stripping of timber and re-
moval of minerals from tax-deeded lands, and would encour-
age tax delinquency, since it would permit the former owner to 
speculate as to whether the proceeds from the property would 
be sufflcient to justify his redeeming and would permit him to 
collect such proceeds until the state took steps to compel 
accounting and payment and then defeat the rights of the 
state by redeeming the property before judgment could be 
obtained. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Trinity 
County. Harold Underwood, Ju(lge. Affirmed. 
,) 
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Action to recoVt'r damag('!'! for timber removed from tax-
deeded land prior to redemption. Judgment for plaintiff 
affirmed. 
BI'onson, Bl'onson & 1rIcKinnon, Harold B. McKinnon and 
Falk &. Falk for Appellants. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine and 
Dan Kaufmanll, Assistant Attorneys General, and Edward P. 
Hollingshead, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
William R. MacDougall as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Oll June 3, 1948, land owned by Bruce L. 
and Virginia B. Codding was deeded to the state for delin-
quent taxes for the year 1942-1943. On August 10, 1953, while 
the land was still deeded to the state, the Coddings agreed 
to sell to Orval Lucas and Elwood Woodburn all the mer-
chantable timber on the land and warranted that there were 
2,000,000 feet of fir and pine. The buyers cut and removed 
812,851 feet of timber, the contract price for which was 
$6,502.80. They ceased cutting when the State Controller 
notified them that the land had been deeded to the state. 
On March 30, 1955, plaintiff filed this action under sections 
344P and 36512 of the Revenue and Taxation Code to recover 
the $6,502.80 for the timber removed from the land. More 
than a year later, on June 22, 1956, the Coddings redeemed 
the property by paying all delinquent taxes, penalties, and 
interest totalling $4,194.21. The trial court found that the 
cutting and removal of the timber teuded permanently to 
impair the value of the property in violation of section 3441 
'Section 3441 provides; "Every person who does any act ten dine 
permanently to impair the value of tax Bold property or tax-deeded 
property is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable for any damages sus-
tained by the State beeause of his act. Such acts include but are not 
limited to the removal, destruction, or cutting of any impro~'ement9 
or timber. On request of the Attorney General or the Controller, tlle 
district attorney of the county where any part of the property is 
located shall: (a) Prosecute for the commission of the misdemeanor. 
(b) In the naDle of the people, sue for damages sustained by the 
State." 
·Section 3651 provides: "After the recording of the deed to the State, 
the State has' exc.l!,lsive power througll the Controller to rent tax-
deeded property amI to reeeive all proceeds nrising in any manner 
from the property except proceeds from a transaction terminating the 
right of redemption, if the right of redemption haa not been termi-
nated, or from a sa.le of a pareel of tnx·deeded property." 
) 
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of the Revellue and Taxation Coue allu entered juuglllcnl 
for plaintiff ill the amount of $6,302.80. Defelluallts appeal. 
Defendants contend that they cannot be requireu to account 
for the proceeds from the sale of the timber on the grounds 
that the amount they paiu to redeem the property included 
taxes on the value added to the land by the timber before it 
was removed and that by paying a reuemption price based 
on the value of the laud including the timber they have ill 
effect already paid the state for the timber. There is no 
merit in this contention. , 
The amount necessary to redeem is 'specified in section 4102 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code as the sum of the "sold 
taxes," delinquent penalties and costs, and redemption penal-
ties. [1] The amount of "sold taxes" is a combination of 
taxes that were a lien on the property when sold to the state 
and the taxes assessed for each subsequent year as shown 
on the delinquent rolls or that would have been shown had 
the property been assessed in cases where it was not assesseu 
for any year. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 123; Sutter-Yuba Invest. 
Co. v. Waste, 21 Ca1.2d 781, 784 [136 P.2d 11].) The assess-
ments for these taxes must take into account any reduction 
in value in the years following removal of timber from the 
land. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 123, 401, 405, 40'6, 566,4104.) 
Thus, the fact that defendants have paid the back taxes on the 
property does not mean that they have paid taxes on removed 
timber. [2] In auy event taxes are exactions for the sup-
port of government, not the purchase price of property. By 
paying the taxes upon redemption defendants were paying 
the amount due for that support and were not buying land 
and timber. Even if redemption could be regarded as a pur-
chase, however, it would be a purchase of the land in the con-
dition it was in at the time of the redemption, and the state 
wonld be no less entitled to the proceeds from the property 
during its ownership than it would had the property been 
sold at public auction. 
[3] The deed to the state conveys absolute title to the 
property. (Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Ca1.2d 269, 273 
[138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111].) The state can occupy such 
property and exploit its natural resources and has the ex-
clusive right to all proceeds from the property including 
proceeds from such resources. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3441. 
3651, supra.) It can improve the property or allow it to de-
teriorate in value. [ 4] The statutory provisions author-
izing redemption are simply an offer by the state to reconv('y 
) 
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the property on the terms prescribed if it has not already 
been sold at public auctioll. (Slttter-Yuba Invest. Co. v. 
Wa.ste, 21 Ca1.2d 781, 785 [136 P.2d 11].) [5] There is 
nothing in the statutes that could reasonably be construed as 
implying that 011 redemption the redemptioner is entitled to 
the property in the condition it was in at the time of the tax 
deed. In fact sueh construction is precluded by the express 
statutory rights given the state and the forfeiture of all 
rights by the former owner except the privilege of redeeming 
on the terms prescribed if the state has not already disposed 
of the property. (Mercury Herald Co. v. Mom'e, 22 Cal.2d, 
.'l1tpra.) 
Defendants' contention that the redemption extinguished 
plaintiff's cause of action would revive an issue settled ad-
versely to them in People v. Maxfield, 30 Cal.2d 485 {183 P.2d 
897}. [6] In upholding in that case the state's right to 
recover rents collected by the taxpayer on tax-deeded land 
between the time of the tax deed and the redemption this 
court declared: 
"The deed to the state, executed pursuant to the statutory 
requirements, conveys absolute title, free of all encumbrances, 
except certain specified liens. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3520.) 
It is not the same title as that of a private pure.haser, because 
the purpose of the conveyance is not the acquisition of the 
property but the collection of the taxes. (AngZo CaZ. Nat. 
Bank v. Leland, 9 Ca1.2d 347, 353 [70 P.2d 937}.) However, 
the only difference between the state's title and that of a 
private purchaser is the privilege of redemption. 'Upon 
execution of the deed [to the State} the property owner for-
feited all rights in the property except the privilege of re-
deeming it at any time before the state disposed of it.' (Mer-
cury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Cal.2d 269, 273 [138 P.2d 673, 
147 A.L.R. U11}.) The state's title is absolute, but subject 
to defeasance should the former owner exercise his privilcge 
of redemption. The tax collector's receipt, authorized by 
section 4107 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which is 
recorded 'like a deed,' is a recollveyance of an absolute title 
owned by the state and issues upon the performance of all 
conditions necessary for redemption. 
[7] "Rights incident to ownership of property conveyed 
to the state are expressly provided for by the Revenue and 
Taxation Code. These include the right to possession (§ 3653) ; 
the right to rent or lease and receive the proceeds from the 
property (§§ 3651 and 3655) ; the right to exact an aecounting 
) 
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of the proceeds of the property (§ 3652) ; the right to bring 
an action of unlawful detainer or ejectment (§ 3654) ; and thc 
right to sell the property at public auction to the highest 
bidder (§ 3476). These rights are no more limited than those 
of an individual who has title to real property. 'l'hey cease 
upon the transfer of title but certain rights, such us that to 
rents and profits which accrued during the period of owner-
ship, are personal and do not pass with the deed nor cease 
to be actionable upon the conveyance of the property. 
[8] Under section 4112 of the Revenue and.. Taxation Code 
the tax deed is not void from the beginning but only upon 
redemption; the state's interest in the land then ceases 
because title has passed to the redemptioner. At that time 
the right to possession of the land, and to lease or rent and 
receive the proceeds, is at an end. So also is the right to sell 
the property at public auction. [9] But a right of action 
which accrued during the period of ownership is not termi-
nated by the redemption; the state is in the same position as 
that of an individual who conveys land to which he has title." 
(30 Ca1.2d at pp. 487-488.) 
What we said in the Maxfield case is controlling here. Both 
cases involve the state's right" to receive aU proceeds arising 
in any manner" from tax-deeded property. (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 3651.) In the Maxfield case the proceeds arose from 
rent; here they arose from the sale of timber. (See also 
Merchants Finance Gorp. v. Kuchel, 83 Cal.App.2d 579, 583 
[189 P.2d 513] where the proceeds the state had the exclu-
sive power to receive arose from the payment of damages by 
the state's lessee for injury to buildings.) [ 1 0 ] The phrase 
"arising in any manner" in section 3651 precludes the draw-
ing of any distinction according to the manner in which 
the proceeds arise. [11] Moreover, the making of any 
exception for proceeds from the sale of timber is also fore-
closed by section 3441 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, 
which makes it a misdemeanor to do any act tending per-
manently to impair the value of tax-deeded property, in-
cluding the cutting or removal of timber, and expressly pro-
vides for the recovery of damages by the state for such cutting 
or removal. [ 12 ] The making of any exception for a re-
demptioner is foreclosed by section 3441, which refers to 
•• every person" and therefore inclurles a redemptioner as 
well as a stranger to the title. [13] Thus in neither sec-
tion 3441, section 3651, the sections governing redemption 
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is there allY Pl'OYi:-iOll t hal llIai{('s the :-Iatc's right to recover 
the proceeds arising froll1 the tax-deeded properly depend on 
whether there has been a redemption of the property. 
[14] Moreover, the state unquestionably suffered dam-
ages during the period it owned the property. .A person 
having an estate in fee 01' in remainder or a reversion may 
maintain an action for an injury to the inheritance even 
though after its commission his estate is transferred and 
he has no interest in the property at the commencement of 
the action. (Civ. Code, § 826.) 
[15] To permit defendants to retain the proceeds froll1 
the sale of the timber would be to condone a brazen trespass 
to property that section 3441 makes a crime and would en-
courage the stripping of timber and the removal of minerals 
from tax-deeded lands. It would also encourage tax delin-
quency, for it would pCl'lllit the former owner to flpeculate 
as to whether the proceeds from the property would be suffi-
cient to justify his redeeming it and would permit him to 
coUect such proceeds until the state took steps to compel an 
accounting aud payment and then defeat the rights of the 
state by redeeming the property before judgment could be 
obtained. As the Maxfield case makes clear, the statutes are 
plainly drawn to preclude such maneuvers. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Plainti1! concedes that "un-
severed trees . . . would pass with the land to the redemp-
tioner," of tax-deeded land. I believe that the better vie,v, 
and one which accords more with a sense of fairness to the 
taxpayer and property owner who redeems, and with the 
declared policy of the state, is that since the trees are part 
of the realty on which the taxes were originally assessed and 
on which the interest and penalties paid by the redemptioner 
accrued, the proceeds of the cut timber should belong to the 
owner who redeemed. Such proceeds plainly ditter in nature 
from rentals collected for usc of the land, whieh were held to 
belong to the state in the Maxfield case. (People v. lIIaxfield 
(1947),30 Cal.2n 485,487-488 {1-4] (183 P.2d 897].) Mor('~ 
over, as reiterated in that ('ase (p.487 [1]), "the pUl'pO!'le of 
the [tax] conveyance is not the acquisition of the property 
but the collection of the taxes." 
.-) 
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In Mcrchant.~ Fillance Corp. ". lluchcl (1948), 83 Cal. 
App.2d 579, 585 lIS9 P.!:!11 51:11, althongh it wal> held thaI 
an owner of ulx-deeul'd property who has 1I0t redeemed it 
may 110t by mandamus require the State Contt'oller "to 
retain and apply" to restoration of the property D1011ey~ 
collected by the state from a tenant as damages to the build-
ings and improvements on the land, the court remarked that 
"There appears to be merit ill appellant's content ion that the 
owner is entitled to have the property restored, , , ill substan-
tially the same condition , . , if and when he redeems the 
property, But that question is not iilVolved in this case since 
the appellant has failed to redeem ... ," Further, in People 
v. Gustafson (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 230, 234 [2] [127 P.2d 
627J, it was pointed out that "it is the settled policy of the 
law to give a delinquent taxpayer every reasonable oppor-
tunity compatible with the rights of the state, to redeem his 
property, and to make his burden as light as possible [cita-
tions] ; and the return to the tax rolls of the property whic11 
has been sold for taxes in order that it may again support i 
general governmental functions is in the public interest. 
[Citation.] " 
Certainly nothing in section 3441 of the Revenue and Tax-
ation Code precludes retention by the o,vner of the timber 
proceeds in this ease, The owner has redeemed; ergo, no dam-
ages by reason of the timber cutting may rightfully be claimNl 
by the state. I would reverse the judgment, 
McComb, J" concurred. 
